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Abstract 
 
In this paper we describe the changes that have taken place in the Norwegian civil 
service over the past 30 years, spanning the period of the ‘old public administration’, the 
New Public Management era and finally the current post-NPM period. We focus on 
demographic changes and on changes in tenure, tasks, attitudes and contact patterns. 
The changes in civil servants’ tasks, attitudes and contacts are analysed using 
generational, career and demographic perspectives. The empirical data base is provided 
by surveys conducted every ten years of civil servants in the ministries. The main 
empirical findings are that there has been a combination of robustness and change in 
the Norwegian civil service over the past 30 years. We find little support for the 
generational perspective. The career perspective, illustrated by the importance of 
position, is best fitted to understand the variations in civil servants’ contact patterns and 
attitudes. Demography, as represented by different educational backgrounds and 
genders, also has an effect. 
   
Sammendrag 
 
I dette notatet beskrives endringer som har skjedd i norsk sentraladministrasjon i løpet 
av de siste 30 år – fra tradisjonell offentlig forvaltning via New Public Management  
(NPM) til reformer i etterkant av NPM. Vi fokuserer på demografiske endringer og 
endringer i tjenestetid, oppgaver, holdninger og kontaktmønster. Endringene i 
tjenestemennenes oppgaver, holdninger og kontaktflater blir analysert ut fra et 
generasjonsperspektiv, et karriereperspektiv og et demografisk perspektiv.  
Datagrunnlaget er spørreskjemaundersøkelser som er gjennomført hvert tiende år fra 
1976 til 2006 blant ansatte i norske departementer. Et viktig empirisk funn er at det har 
vært en kombinasjon av robusthet og endring i norske departementer i løpet av de siste 
30 år. Vi finner lite støtte for et generasjonsperspektiv mens et karriereperspektiv, 
illustrert ved betydningen av hvilket stillingsnivå de ansatte har, er best egnet til å forstå 
variasjoner i tjenestemennenes kontaktmønster og holdninger. Demografiske 
kjennetegn, representert ved utdanningsbakgrunn og kjønn, har også en effekt. 
  
Introduction 
Over the past two or three decades the central civil service in many countries has 
experienced much change and turbulence. Three different phases of development are 
discernible – the “old Weberian public administration”, the NPM era and, more 
recently, what has come to be labelled the post-NPM phase (Christensen, Lie and 
Lægreid 2007). Some see these as phases of dominance, whereby each new reform wave 
pushes aside the main features of the former generation and installs its own 
administrative principles. Another view, and the one we address here, is that each phase 
involves a rebalancing of existing and new features, so that previous features continue to 
exist; but sometimes in new forms (Light 1998, Pierson 2004, Streeck and Thelen 2005). 
The result is an increase in the complexity of administrative structures and culture. 
When studying the history of the civil service it therefore seems appropriate to take an 
“archaeological” approach (Lægreid et al. 2003). 
 In this paper we will first describe the changes in the Norwegian civil service over the 
past 30 years, spanning the three development phases mentioned, by focusing on 
demographic changes and on changes in tenure, tasks, attitudes and contact patterns. 
Second, we will analyse variations in civil servants’ tasks, attitudes and contacts in 2006.1  
The tenure of civil servants seems to be a potentially important variable to focus on in 
this respect. People who have spent many years in the civil service are the carriers of the 
history of civil service institutions – functioning as their living memory – and will hence 
pass on the history and cultural norms and values of the institution to coming 
generations (March and Olsen 1989, Selznick 1957). They are important for the 
“regeneration” aspect and for the ideal that turn-over will be gradual enough to allow 
older civil servants to socialize and train younger ones (Pfeffer 1983). But civil servants 
with long tenure are important for other reasons, too, since they are naturally 
overrepresented among administrative leaders. They bring to leadership positions 
experience and attitudes formed over a long period of time and informed by a mixture 
of tradition and change. 
 A crucial question addressed in this paper is whether civil servants with long tenure 
in the central public administration are living in the past. Are their tasks more related to 
the “old public administration” – in other words, tasks related to laws, rules, single 
cases, etc. – than those of civil servants with a shorter tenure whose tasks will be more 
‘modern’ and NPM-oriented and include things like planning and policy development, 
organizational development, regulation, performance measurement or else the more 
coordinative tasks associated with the post-NPM phase. Are their attitudes to their roles 
and identity more ‘old-fashioned’? And do they have a broader and different contact 
pattern to civil servants with shorter tenure? Is the significance of tenure stronger in 
these respects than other independent variables like position, gender or education? 
These questions will be addressed by using three theoretical approaches – a generational 
perspective, a cumulative career perspective and a demographic perspective. 
                                                 
1 The main reason for analysing only the variations in the 2006 data is that the earlier surveys are more difficult to use 
as an illustration of the division of the three periods. 
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The data used to analyse the main research questions are primarily from a large survey 
conducted of civil servants in the Norwegian ministries in 2006, but comparable surveys 
from 1976, 1986 and 1996 are also used to show developmental features of the 
Norwegian central civil service.2 
We will first give a brief outline of the Norwegian context. Then we will introduce the 
three theoretical perspectives and apply them to the survey data. Third, we will describe 
the changes in demographic composition and tenure over time, followed by a 
description of the changes in tasks, attitudes and contact patterns. Fourth, we will 
analyse the variation in tasks, attitudes and contact patterns by examining the 
importance of tenure and of structural and demographic features. Finally, we will draw 
some general conclusions. 
 
The Norwegian context - historical development 
and reform waves 
The Norwegian constitution dates from 1814, the year that ended 400 years of 
subordination to Denmark and marked its entry into a union with Sweden  that lasted 
until 1905. The central civil service established after 1814 had strong hierarchical and 
centralized features (Christensen 2003). The most important aspect of the centralized 
state was the establishment of seven ministries dominated by jurists, a situation that 
lasted right up until the 1970s. In the years following 1814 various professional groups 
became rather sceptical towards the centralized state model and demanded professional 
autonomy. As a result, between 1840 and 1880 a number of specialized, sectoral 
agencies dominated by different professional groups were established (Christensen and 
Roness 1999). These agencies were based on the Swedish model, but were later 
modified to become semi-autonomous bodies, a model still dominant today. 
 From an early stage the centralized state model in Norway was based very much on 
Rechtsstaat values. It displayed Weberian features and the majority of civil servants and 
politicians were jurists (Christensen 2003). Over time this state model acquired cultural 
features related to nation-building and designed to integrate different groups culturally 
and to develop collective norms and values (Slagstad 1998). This process of cultural 
integration aimed both to reconcile geographically-based cultural differences but 
eventually also to integrate the growing working class (Rokkan and Valen 1970). After 
World War II another integrative process started whose aim was to bring about 
systematic organizational participation in government (Olsen 1983). Interest groups 
were increasingly formally integrated into public decision-making processes via various 
organizational forms. They were seen as special interests but also as participating in a 
collective effort to build the welfare state. They represented strong pressure for equality 
as a central value and norm in various policy areas, such as wage equality. 
                                                 
2  The respondents were all civil servants in the ministries from executive officers to top civil servants. The response 
rate was 67 percent in 2006 compared with 72 percent in 1976, 1986 and 1996. 
WORKING  PAPER  1  –  2008 LIVING  IN THE  PAST?. ..  
 
8 
 Summing up the historical development, the ‘old public administration’ or civil 
service, built on centralization, educational homogeneity of civil servants, cultural 
integration and corporatist features, was really established during the Labour Party’s 
term in office from 1946 until 1965, when for most of that time it formed majority and 
single-party governments, labelled the ‘one-party state’. This form of public 
administration remained very strong in the 1970s but was modified somewhat by 
decentralizing elements. 
 During the 1980s Norway experienced a period of turbulent transition. There was a 
marked but not very strong move to the right, partly supported by a modernized and 
increasingly right-leaning Labour Party, and this gradually changed administrative policy 
(Christensen and Lægreid 1998b). Nevertheless, when NPM was introduced Norway did 
not jump on the band-wagon but remained a reluctant reformer for the next 10-15 years 
(Olsen 1996). In 1986 the Center-Right government introduced a modernization 
program, and the next year the Labour Party proposed a renewal program for the civil 
service. Both programs were inspired by NPM, but reflected primarily NPM rhetoric 
and did not result in much action. Starting in the 1990s the corporative system became 
weaker and Norway gradually introduced some NPM features. Management by 
Objectives and Results was introduced in all government organizations, followed by the 
gradual structural devolution of state-owned enterprises and agencies. The most marked 
NPM-oriented period was during the Conservative-Centre government’s term in office 
from 2001 to 2005, when a regulatory reform was implemented and increasing use was 
made of efficiency-related measures. The Red-Green government that came to power in 
2005 was elected on an anti-NPM ticket, but it has been slow to reverse or modify NPM 
measures (Christensen and Lie 2007). 
 If we relate our surveys to the NPM and post-NPM reforms, we can assume that at 
the time the 1986 survey was conducted the old public administration was still in place.3 
The survey of 1996 seems to show the first NPM features (Christensen and Lægreid 
1998a), while the 2006 survey shows the tension between NPM and post-NPM reform 
measures. The 2006 survey reflects both the general experience of the post-NPM phase 
and also the major reorganizations that were taking place at the time designed to 
increase control and horizontal coordination, like the new labour and welfare reform 
(Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007). 
 
Generational, career and demographic 
perspectives 
Broadly speaking, tenure as a demographic variable concerns certain aspects of 
employment in formal organizations (Pfeffer 1983, Tsui et al. 1995, 1999). Tenure is 
different from other demographic variables, which concern social background, and 
focuses primarily on the experience and career paths of civil servants. Tenure reflects 
                                                 
3 The division between the periods is reflected in the way the tenure variable is constructed, as shown below. 
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the dynamic between civil servants’ background and the structural and cultural 
constraints to which they are subjected inside the civil service; the longer the tenure, the 
more complex this dynamic is. 
 When used as a variable to analyse the development and working of the central civil 
service tenure may be defined in different ways. First, tenure may be seen in a generational 
perspective. When people enter the civil service, they do so in a certain historical context. 
This embraces a number of factors, one of which is education. Civil servants educated 
during the student revolution of the late 1960s, for example, will have a different 
background and attitudes to those educated during the educational reforms of the 
1990s. Another factor is the political, societal, economic and technological constraints 
prevailing at the time they entered the civil service, but also the current political-
administrative structure and culture, including whether the civil service is going through 
a period of turbulence or not. At any given moment central government institutions are 
a shifting residue of history, and it is important to take lags in adjustment into account 
(Stinchcombe 1965, March and Olsen 1989). The theory of path-dependency would 
expect civil servants’ attitudes and behaviour further on in their careers to be influenced 
by the historical context of their formative years, i. e. their cultural “roots” will influence 
the “paths” taken later (Krasner 1988, Selznick 1957, Pierson 2004). 
 In accordance with this analytical view one would expect there to be distinct 
generations of civil servants in different development phases, and tenure would hence 
explain variations in attitudes, role enactment, identities, contacts, etc. But such a view 
makes certain assumptions that may not or may not be valid. One is that each period, in 
spite of overlapping reforms, really is quite distinct and thus leaves its own specific 
generational mark on civil servants. This assumes that most of the contextual 
constraints point in one direction and do not show an inconsistent pattern. It also 
assumes that path-dependency plays a dominant role over other factors, like hierarchical 
position, education or gender, and is the key factor in shaping civil servants’ attitudes, 
identities and contact patterns. 
 One challenge of using such a perspective, therefore, is to delimit and define the 
different generations of civil servants and their historical roots, and to identify the 
effects and implications these have. Ideally, one would be able to do this using a wider 
range of contextual factors in clearly defined generations, but a simpler solution is to 
define them according to the main features of the civil service and its reforms, as 
indicated. The generation exposed to the ‘old public administration’ will thus in many 
countries be those people who started their careers in the period up to the early 1980s. 
The New Public Management generation is the one that started their careers from the 
late 1980s, while ‘post-NPM’ covers the period from the early 2000s. There will, of 
course, be variations in the timing of NPM and post-NPM in many countries and we 
will later put the Norwegian context in perspective in this respect. 
 The generational perspective stresses that civil servants in many respects will be 
‘stuck in their generation’, meaning that the experience of their formative years will be 
far more important for their later attitudes and identities than what they experience later 
in their career. This perspective focuses on the importance of timing and temporal 
sequences, placing the bureaucrats in different social contexts that will affect their later 
attitudes and behaviour (Pierson 2004, Orren and Skowronek 1994).  
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 A second perspective is a cumulative career one. In contrast to the first perspective, 
which looks at external societal factors, this perspective focuses on the importance of 
internal socialization and discipline (Lægreid and Olsen 1978, 1984). Socialization 
encompasses attitude formation and the process whereby civil servants internalize the 
prevailing values in the ministries, while discipline is more preoccupied with behavioural 
control through promotion mechanisms. Norwegian civil servants reach the top of the 
administrative hierarchy in the ministries after going through several socialization and 
disciplinary filters designed to produce a responsible bureaucracy (Lægreid and Olsen 
1978). Civil servants generally start their careers as executive officers dealing with single 
cases and performing simple tasks. Later they move on to more general work and are 
gradually promoted to leadership positions, where they come into contact with a wider 
variety of actors, etc.  
 Unlike the generational perspective, this perspective stresses that civil servants 
accumulate experience in the course of their careers and that their experience will reflect 
the stage they are currently at. This perspective combines tenure and position. In line 
with the effects of vertical structural differentiation, those in positions higher up the 
hierarchy will have more general tasks, pay more attention to political signals, have a 
more holistic identity and broader contacts. In addition the classical bureaucrat will act 
in a manner appropriate to his or her position rather than in accordance with personal 
preferences and can be trusted to do so, even in the face of considerable temptation to 
act differently (March and Olsen 1989, Lægreid and Olsen 1978). Civil servants with 
long tenure and in top positions have normally made a career within the civil service.  
 Tenure, according to this perspective, will produce different expectations to those 
connected with the generational perspective. As civil servants move through a system 
based on a career structure, their experience, for example of reforms, will be more 
cumulative and blended and will not yield such distinct categories of identity as those 
associated with particular generations of reforms and historical periods. What would be 
the general effects of tenure according to such a perspective? We would expect long 
tenure to be connected with having general tasks, attending more to political signals, 
identifying with the civil service as a whole and establishing a broad range of long-term 
contacts. This will apply to people in top positions, especially those with a long career. 
Simon’s (1957) main argument, according to the theory of bounded rationality, is that 
where a civil servant is located structurally will have an importance influence on his or 
her behaviour, because formal structure channels attention and capacity. Leaders will 
therefore have a different structural outlook, different attitudes and contacts, and will 
behave differently to actors lower down in the hierarchy.  
 In most respects the two variables in the career perspective, tenure and position, will 
yield similar predictions, based on the premise that most civil servants with long tenure 
will probably also be in leadership positions. But civil servants with long tenure may also 
have more professionally related jobs, remaining in advisory positions, for example, 
rather than becoming leaders, i.e. in other words promotion is a selective process. This 
may weaken the effects of position. Tenure is also a more complex factor than position, 
and has elements that may point in different directions, producing a less clear profile. 
 A third perspective, and an alternative one to the first two, is a demographic perspective 
(Lægreid and Olsen 1978, Pfeffer 1983). Instead of stressing generational effects or 
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career effects, this perspective deemphasizes tenure and focuses more on how 
individually oriented demographic variables, either separately or in combination, have 
more significance than tenure and position for attitudes, identity and contacts. This 
perspective holds that type of higher education is more important for differentiating 
tasks, signals, roles, identities and contacts than tenure, as is gender. 
 One basis for such an individual perspective is that the personal background of civil 
servants will influence their modes of thought and behaviour in the civil service. 
Through early socialization based on gender and education a civil servant arrives in a 
government institution with certain ‘baggage’ that affects his or her subsequent attitudes 
and behaviour. The theory of representative bureaucracy presupposes that social 
background, whether based on prescribed features (gender) or acquired features 
(educational background), will be important for attitudes and action (Lægreid and Olsen 
1978, Meier 1973). According to this perspective, where you come from will be more 
significant than where you are located in the formal civil service structure or what 
cohort or generation of civil servants you belong to.  
Studies of cohorts are related to all three of the above perspectives in different ways 
(Pfeffer 1983). They stress that the civil service recruits groups of civil servants at 
certain points in time and that each cohort acquired the same experience when passing 
through generations of reforms and entering different stages of their careers. The 
cohorts are, however, of different sizes and different complexity, which may influence 
now much effect they have on attitudes, identities and contacts. We will not analyse the 
data from such a complex cohort angle, i.e. combining a generational perspective and a 
more individual perspective into a contextual analysis. It will, however, be relevant to 
understand the dynamic between the perspectives. We believe each of these 
perspectives captures some aspects of the role, attitudes and behaviour of civil servants. 
Their perceptions, attitudes and behaviour emerge from rather complex socially 
embedded intra- and inter-organizational processes that cannot easily or adequately be 
captured by the concepts of total autonomy or total subordination, but must instead be 
seen as a complex interaction between generational features, career and internal factors 
and demographic variables. 
 Expectations. Table 1 shows some broad expectations we have about the 
correlation between tenure and the dependent variables, based on the different 
perspectives. The generational and career perspectives focus on tenure as a primary 
factor, while the individual one may tend to see tenure as one of many significant 
variables. Based on the data below on single cases as a main task, we would expect, from 
a generational perspective, that administrative leaders with long tenure would score 
higher on single cases, while civil servants with short tenure would have more general 
tasks related to planning, policy development and coordination, because these kinds of 
tasks were the ones that became dominant or ‘modern’ during their formative years, 
whereas those with longer tenure entered the civil service at a time when single tasks 
were the norm. The career perspective produces quite the opposite expectation – civil 
servants with long tenure will have more general tasks, because they will have normally 
moved up the hierarchy, while those with shorter tenure will focus more on single cases 
because they are still at the beginning of their careers.  
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Table 1. Expectations based on generational, career and demographic perspectives. 
 Generational perspective Career  
perspective 
Demographic 
perspectiveve 
Tasks More single cases for 
people with long 
tenure. 
More general tasks for 
short tenure 
More general tasks for long 
tenure. 
More single cases for short 
tenure. 
More general tasks for 
leaders 
Type of education matters: 
More single cases for 
jurists. More general tasks 
for economists and social 
scientists.  
Women have more general 
tasks 
Rules Rules more significant 
for long tenure 
Rules less significant for 
long tenure. 
Leaders less rule-driven  
 
Jurists most affected by 
rules. 
Women less influenced by 
rules 
Identities 
 
Stronger identification 
with ministry for 
long tenure. 
Mixed profile for short 
tenure,   
more identification 
with own unit 
 
More identification with civil 
service as a whole for long 
tenure. 
Mixed profile for short 
tenure, more identification 
with own unit. 
More identification with civil 
service as a whole and own 
ministry for leaders 
Social scientists identify 
more with civil service as a 
whole. 
Economists and jurists 
identify more with own 
unit. 
Women identify more with 
civil service as a whole 
 
Signals  More political signals 
for long tenure. 
More professional 
considerations 
for short tenure  
More political signals for 
long tenure. 
Less distinct profile for short 
tenure. 
More political signals for 
leaders  
More professional 
considerations for 
economists. 
More political signals for 
political scientists. 
More political signals for 
women  
Contacts More contact with 
political and 
administrative 
leadership with long 
tenure. 
More contact with 
interest organizations. 
with long tenure 
Both broader contacts and 
more frequent contacts with 
political and administrative 
leadership for long tenure. 
Leaders have the broadest 
and most frequent contacts 
Social scientists have the 
broadest contacts, jurists 
the narrowest. 
Economists have the most 
contacts with the political 
leadership. 
Men have the broadest and 
most frequent contacts 
Reform-
orientation 
Long tenure scores 
low on NPM and post-
NPM 
Medium tenure scores 
high on NPM 
Short tenure scores 
highest on post-NPM 
Those with long tenure and 
high structural position 
score high on both NPM and 
post-NPM 
Jurists score low on NPM-
orientation. 
Social scientists score high 
on NPM and post-NPM-
orientation. 
Economists score high on 
NPM. 
Women score higher than 
men on NPM and lower on 
post-NPM 
 
Whether civil servants have clear rules directing their work or a lot of discretion may be 
related to both the generational and the career perspective. The expectation in a 
generational perspective would be that those with long tenure will score high on rules 
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directing their work, since the old public administration was more rule-oriented, while 
those with short tenure will be more influenced by the greater goal-orientation and 
autonomy associated with modern reforms, and will probably therefore have more 
discretion. The opposite expectation could be formulated from a career perspective, 
since those with long tenure will tend to be further up the hierarchy and hence less 
subject to formal constraints and in leading positions where there are either competing 
formal rules or generally more discretion. 
 Concerning political signals, from both perspectives one would expect long tenure to 
be related to attending more to political signals, but for different reasons. According to 
the generational perspective this relationship might occur because of the generally 
greater emphasis on hierarchy in the ‘old public administration’, while a career 
perspective might explain this in terms of the greater political sensitivity acquired 
through leadership experience. The perspectives may differ concerning those with short 
tenure, because a generational perspective would predict that professional 
considerations would have become more important during the last decade than they 
were thirty years ago, partly because of increased autonomy, while the career perspective 
would have greater difficulty formulating a clear profile. 
 Identities may differ according to the two perspectives. In the generational 
perspective identification with the ministry would have been more common under the 
‘old public administration’. In a career perspective long tenure would imply the 
accumulation of a lot of experience, leading to stronger identification with the civil 
service as a whole. For short tenure, both perspectives would probably predict more 
identification with own unit, since the last decade has been more marked by the 
decentralizing elements of NPM, but post-NPM factors may also be relevant here, 
making the profile more mixed. 
 We would expect contact patterns to differ according to the two perspectives. A 
generational perspective would associate long tenure with greater contact with the 
political and administrative leadership, since the hierarchy in the ministry was less rigid 
and the leadership structure more open 20 years ago. We would also predict more 
contact with interest groups, because such contact was more frequent three decades ago. 
In a career perspective long tenure would mean the accumulation of a broad set of 
contacts and more frequent contacts with the political and administrative leadership – 
the latter both because civil servants with long tenure would include more leaders and 
because the more hierarchical leadership structure would produce greater differentiation 
between actors.  
 We focus on two variables concerning NPM and post-NPM, respectively. The NPM 
indicator is whether the civil servant attributes much importance or relevance to 
performance reporting and evaluation, while the post-NPM indicator focuses on the 
quality of coordination between own policy field and government bodies in other fields. 
Based on a generational perspective, we would expect people with long tenure, meaning 
those who started their careers in the late 1980s or earlier, to score low both on an 
NPM- and a post-NPM-orientation. The career perspective, on the other hand, would 
expect civil servants with long tenure and in leadership positions to score high on both 
an NPM- and a post-NPM-orientation, because they have been obliged to handle the 
various measures and have the experience to do so.  
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From a demographic perspective, we would expect jurists to score low on NPM and 
social scientists to score high both on an NPM- and a post-NPM-orientation and 
economists to score high on NPM measures. Our analysis of the 1996 survey showed 
that women overall scored higher on NPM measures than men, except for the most 
radical measures, i.e. they were modified modernizers (Christensen and Lægreid 1998a). 
Accordingly, we would expect women to score higher on NPM-orientation here, 
because performance reporting is part of Management by Objectives and Results, a 
measure seen as a more moderate feature of NPM. We would expect men to score 
higher on post-NPM coordinative measures, because they are more strongly represented 
in the administrative leadership. 
 Structural position – whether civil servants are in leadership positions or not is 
generally assumed to matter. We would expect leaders to have more general tasks, 
because a high position in the hierarchy is related to more general and coordinative 
responsibility. They will be less rule-driven than executive officers, attend more to 
political signals, identify more with the civil service as a whole and with their own 
ministry, have the broadest and most frequent contacts with a wide range of actors, and 
attend more to both NPM and post-NPM measures. 
 When Lægreid and Olsen (1978) did their study of factors explaining the attitudes, 
experience and contacts of civil servants in Norway, using survey data from 1976, they 
applied two analytical models. One was the ‘responsible bureaucracy’, which attended to 
structural variables (like position); the other was the ‘representative bureaucracy’, which 
focused on individual demographic variables, including social background variables, like 
education and gender. The main empirical finding was that structural variables had 
stronger explanatory power than demographic ones. Among the structural ones, 
position in the hierarchy was overall the most important, while type of education was 
the most significant demographic variable. Our analysis of the 1996 survey, which 
focused on NPM-related measures in the civil service, in many ways confirms this main 
picture (Christensen and Lægreid 1998a). 
 Our demographic perspective, which is posited as an alternative to the tenure-related 
perspectives, focuses on gender and education. Type of education is assumed to have a 
differentiating effect, so that jurists are expected to work more on single cases, be more 
rule-driven, and identify more with their own unit, while social scientists are more likely 
to be generalists concerning tasks, have an education-based affinity to political signals, 
have a more holistic identification and have the broadest contacts. Economists are 
expected to have more general tasks, be more affected by professional considerations 
and identify more with their own unit, since they are more NPM-oriented (Christensen 
and Lægreid 1998a), and have most contact with the political leadership (Lægreid and 
Olsen (1978). 
 It is more difficult to make predictions about gender. Lægreid and Olsen (1978) 
found relatively few effects of gender in their study, but they predicted that an increase 
in the proportion of women in the civil service would make gender a more significant 
variable, which has turned out to be correct. In their study of NPM in the civil service, 
Christensen and Lægreid (1998a) found some influence of gender. They discovered, for 
example, that women were more likely to be modernizers than men, who were more 
politically loyal and professionally oriented, but women were modified modernizers 
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while men attended more to market-type reforms. Analyses of the 2006 survey confirm 
that women take a more negative attitude to market instruments (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2007a). An analysis of those data, but with a focus on coordination, show that 
women experience horizontal coordination and societal coordination more positively 
than men, which might be related to the fact that they are less represented in leadership 
positions and have less hierarchy-oriented attitudes (Christensen and Lægreid 2007b). 
 In this study we would expect women to have more general tasks and to be less 
influenced by rules, because of their being recruited to the civil service later and having 
shorter tenure. We would also expect them to be more oriented towards political signals 
and to identify more with the civil service as a whole because of their more general 
positive orientation towards and greater trust in government (Christensen and Lægreid 
2005). We would also expect women to have narrower and less frequent contacts with 
other actors than men because they are less integrated in the civil service, but overall to 
be more positive about most NPM measures. 
 
The independent variables: changes in the civil 
service 1976-20064 
Tenure. Traditionally the trend in Norway has been for civil servants to have life-long 
careers in the ministries, often the same ministry. Over time it seems to have become 
more common to change one’s job more frequently, primarily inside the ministerial or 
agency structure, but in some cases moving to the private sector, at least for some 
groups. This has reduced the average tenure somewhat. A natural generational change 
occurred in the mid-1970s and 1980s, because jurists who entered the ministries after 
World War II retired; making way for people with different educational backgrounds. 
 Table 2 shows considerable stability in the average tenure in the ministries in the 
period 1976–2006, perhaps indicating a rather successful ‘regeneration’ process. The 
reduction in average tenure between 1976 and1986 is related, as mentioned, to a rather 
large generational turn-over in that period. There is some variation between the 
ministries concerning tenure, but this decreases over time. 
 
                                                 
4 The trends described in this section are mainly based on analyses made by Langhoff (2007). 
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Table 2. Tenure, formal position, education and gender composition in Norwegian ministries. 1976–
2006. Percentage.  
 1976 1986 1996 2006 
Average tenure in the ministries (years) 13 11 10 11 
Position: 
Top leaders 
Mid-level 
Executive officers 
 
10 
37 
52 
 
8 
39 
53 
 
5 
45 
50 
 
5 
51 
44 
Education: 
Jurists 
Economists 
Social scientists 
 
38 
18 
4 
 
27 
18 
13 
 
22 
18 
18 
 
22 
16 
24 
Gender: 
Women 
 
15 
 
26 
 
43 
 
48 
N (average) (784) (1183) (1426) (1677) 
 
 Hierarchical position. The hierarchy in the Norwegian ministries has changed over 
time in a number of ways. The proportion of leadership positions has decreased, while 
the proportion of advisory positions has increased, reflecting changes in the way the 
work is organized, with an increase in the number of projects, collegial structures and 
team-work.5 Among the leaders in the hierarchy, relatively fewer are top leaders than 
before and relatively more are mid-level leaders (the greatest increase being at the top of 
this group), as shown in Table 2. This reflects both an increase in the number of 
coordinative tasks and attempts to shield top leaders from increasing pressure and 
capacity problems. This means that the executive officers at the bottom of the hierarchy 
have less formal access to top leaders then 30 years ago. Variations in the shape of the 
hierarchy between ministries seem to decrease over time, but the new profile seems to 
be slightly more common for the typically coordinative ministries and less so for the 
sectoral ministries. There is a significant positive correlation between long tenure and 
holding a leading position, as we would expect from a career perspective.6 
 Educational background. Historically, the educational background of civil servants 
in the Norwegian ministries has predominantly been law school. The first challenge to 
this dominance came in the 1950s with the influx of economists to meet the increasing 
need for planning competence. Since then, the proportion of economists in the 
ministries has not increased much further (by slightly less than 10%), but in several 
important ministries, particularly the Ministry of Finance, they have risen to occupy 
central leadership positions. Social scientists started to enter the ministries in the 1970s 
and since then their share has increased from 4% in 1976 to 24% in 2006, as shown in 
Table 2, making them the largest educational group in the ministries. The growth of this 
group, which is dominated by political scientists, has come about as a response to the 
                                                 
5 Advisors are a rather heterogeneous group, with a wide range of wages and tasks, often rather loosely coupled to the 
line organization. 
6 In 2006 the correlation between tenure and position was .30 (sign=.000, Pearson R). 
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demand for more expertise on planning and policy development, and probably 
coordination as well, but as far as its tasks are concerned this group is rather flexible and 
does not perform a distinctive set of tasks, reflecting a trend towards less 
professionalisation. In the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s the kind of expertise 
required by NPM led to the employment of business economists by the ministries. Since 
then, however, their share (around 7-8%) has not increased, even though more NPM 
measures have been introduced. As for the jurists, their share has diminished over the 
last 30 years from 38% in 1976 to 22% in 1996, but since then it has been stable, 
probably reflecting an increased demand for legal expertise related to adaptation to the 
EU and the EEA-treaty. The overall rather large change in the educational composition 
of the ministries makes them more heterogeneous, with less dominance of groups with 
a particular educational background.  
 Gender. The historical trend in Norway has been a rather sharp increase in the 
number of women in the workforce, including in the public sector, since the share of 
women obtaining higher education has also increased quite a lot. Table 2 shows clearly 
that the share of women in the Norwegian ministries has increased sharply in the 30-
year period studied, from 15% to 48%, indicating a feminization of the civil service 
(Lægreid 1995). What is interesting is that the increase has been much lower over the 
last decade, which seems rather surprising given that the share of women in higher 
education has increased even further during this period.  
 If we look at the relationship between gender and hierarchical position, we find that 
the increase in the share of women has been highest among executive officers at the 
bottom of the organization – 40% between 1976 and 2006 – while the comparable 
increase for mid-level leaders and top leaders has been 28% and 20%, respectively. This 
has to do with when the larger cohorts of women were recruited and the number of 
years it takes to reach the leadership level. The increase of the share of women among 
executive officers between 1996 and 2006 was only 3%, however, while the comparative 
increase for mid-level positions and top leaders, respectively, was 8% and 5%, so the 
representation of women is ‘maturing’. 
 
Describing the dependent variables: tasks, 
attitudes and contact 
Tasks. What kind of main function or task a civil servant has reflects what kind of 
functions his or her ministry focuses on, even though some functions are similar across 
ministries. Long-term changes in the main function also reflect changes in the function 
of ministries in the political-administrative system. The main trend in this respect is for 
ministries to become more like secretariats for the political executive leadership, 
attending more to planning and coordinative functions and later to controlling agencies, 
while single cases are deemphasized (Christensen and Lægreid 1998b). 
 Table 3 shows quite clearly that the main functions of civil servants have changed 
quite a lot in the 30-year period studied. The most dramatic change has been the sharp 
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fall in the number of civil servants working on single cases, which very much reflects the 
intentional change in profile mentioned. Accordingly, there has also been a 
corresponding marked increase in the share of civil servants involved in legislation, 
planning/policy development and coordination. This development reflects both NPM 
and post-NPM features but regarding law-related tasks also increased integration into 
EU through the EEA agreement. While NPM produced more frame-steering and more 
planning and policy development, it also resulted in more structural fragmentation, 
which increased the need for coordination – a typical post-NPM feature. Again, 
variation among the ministries concerning their main function is rather high, but as in 
the case of tenure, it diminished during the period 1976–2006. 
 
Table 3. Main task of civil servants. 1976–2006. Percentage. 
 1976 1986 1996 2006 
Law-related 10 10 15 16 
Single cases 28 22 13 7 
Planning/policy development 20 22 28 29 
Coordination 8 13 16 19 
Other functions (budget, ICT, personnel, 
control, information etc.) 
34 33 28 30 
(N=100%  (722) (1105)  (1312)  (1832) 
 
 Rules and discretion.  Here the question is whether civil servants have 
unambiguous rules and established practice as a basis for their daily work, or whether 
discretionary behaviour is more typical. One of the main elements of NPM was to 
change the administrative culture from a rule-based bureaucratic mode towards a more 
performance- and result-oriented mode with greater discretion for managers and civil 
servants in general. With the increase in central control and coordination associated with 
the post-NPM reforms one expectation might be the reintroduction of stricter rules and 
less managerial freedom, in contrast to the management-orientation of NPM.  
 
Table 4. Rules/established practice or discretion in the task enactment of civil servants. 1976–2006. 
Percentage. 
 1976 1986 1996 2006 
Unambiguous rules 
Both rule orientation and discretion 
Large discretion/leeway 
34 
33 
33 
31 
34 
34 
36 
34 
30 
40 
31 
29 
N=100% (776) (1176) (1464) (1854) 
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Table 4 primarily shows great stability in this respect. First, there is no significant 
increase in managerial discretion and leeway or a reduction in rule-based administration 
from the 1970s and 1980s to the 1990s, in spite of the NPM movement and its focus on 
a cultural change of this kind. More autonomy seems to be followed by more rules and 
regulation, i.e. deregulation and re-regulation seem to go in tandem (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2006). And leaders are not less rule-oriented than non-leaders. Second, there is 
no significant change from 1996 to 2006 in the balance between rule-orientation and 
managerial autonomy, in other words there is no indication of a major shift in a post-
NPM direction, mainly because the NPM movement had such a weak general impact on 
rule-orientation in the first place in the mid-1990s. The general picture is that the civil 
servants can be divided into three relatively stable groups of fairly equal size: 1/3 rule-
oriented, 1/3 having managerial autonomy and 1/3 in the middle. In a long-term 
perspective there is a weak trend towards increased rule orientation, in contrast to what 
would be expected from the NPM movement. 
 Role orientation. We also describe how much weight civil servants attach to various 
considerations in their daily work, i.e. we examine the balance between different 
elements and decision-making premises in their role enactment. Table 5 shows clearly 
that political loyalty, expressed through attention to political signals, but also 
knowledge-based and professional considerations, are very important. The relative 
importance of these main considerations is high and has remained stable over the last 
two decades. Table 5 shows clearly the importance and robustness of these two classic 
bureaucratic elements, political loyalty and professional considerations7. 
 
Table 5. Strong or very strong importance allotted to different role considerations among civil servants in 
Norwegian ministries. 1986-2006. Percent. 
Role considerations: 1986 1996 2006 
Knowledge-based and professional considerations 89 91 95 
Signals from political leadership 88 89 89 
 
 Identity. Table 6 shows that civil servants’ identification with their own department 
is high and has remained stable. Identification with their own ministry is also strong and 
has increased over the past ten years. This pattern illustrates the importance of the 
Norwegian position-based civil service system in which recruitment is decentralized to 
each individual ministry or agency and not carried out by a senior executive service or 
central recruitment body (Lægreid and Wise 2007). Identification with central 
government as a whole is lower, but has increased substantially over the past decade, 
indicating the emergence of post-NPM features. 
 
                                                 
7 Such a question was not included in the survey in 1976. 
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Table 6. Strong or very strong identity with own department, own ministry or central government in 
general. 1996–2006. Percentage. 
 1996 2006 
Identification with own department
8
 
Identification with own ministry 
Identification with central government in general 
85 
73 
34 
84 
80 
51 
N (average) 1439 1668 
 
 Contact patterns. Table 7 reveals that internal contact with administrative leaders in 
own ministry is high and stable. Contact with political executives in own ministry is 
much lower and in fact decreased somewhat in the 1990s and later compared with the 
1970s and 1980s, reflecting capacity problems among the political executives. Contact 
with interest organizations has decreased significantly since the 1970s, which was the 
peak of the Norwegian corporative system (Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999). In line 
with the weakening of the corporative system in Norway we also see less frequent 
contacts between civil servants in the ministries and interest organizations in business, 
trade and industry and with civil servants’ unions.9  
 
Table 7. Monthly or more frequent contact with own minister, administrative top leaders in own 
ministry and interest groups. 1976-2006. Percentage. 
 1976 1986 1996 2006 
Contact with own minister  42 45 33 34 
Contact with administrative top leaders in own 
ministry 
 87 77 83 
Contact with interest organizations in business, 
trade and industry 
Contact with civil service unions 
 
(43) 
 
28 
26 
 
19 
19 
 
16 
15 
N (average) 770 1164 1457 1804 
 
 Reform orientation. Our indicator for NPM-oriented reforms is performance 
reporting and evaluation. Management by Objectives and Results is a core NPM 
instrument in Norway, and performance reporting is a main component of this 
performance management system (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2006). In 1996 
almost half of the civil servants said that performance reporting and evaluation were 
                                                 
8 In Scandinavia, unlike some Anglo-Saxon countries, every central administrative unit on the highest level is labeled 
a ministry, rather than both ministry and (line) department. Department in Norway means the basic large units that 
a ministry consists of and these are subdivided into divisions or sections. 
9 The percentage for 1976 is not directly comparable with the later years because no distinction was made between 
civil servant unions and other interest organizations within industry, trade and business 
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important or very important or relevant in their own field of work. Ten years later the 
percentage had dropped to 38 (Table 8), indicating that NPM has peaked.  
    
Table 8. Attitudes towards NPM and post NPM reform measures. 2006. Percentage 
 1996 2006 
Performance reporting and evaluation important or very important or 
relevant  
 
46 
 
38 
Coordination between own field and government bodies in other policy 
areas is good or very good 
 
- 
 
45 
N(average) 1334 1396 
Not relevant is excluded. -: Question not posted in 1996. 
 
While the performance management system is mainly preoccupied with vertical control 
and coordination within own policy area or sector, post-NPM reforms are more 
concerned about horizontal coordination problems across sector specialization in 
central government. In 2006 fewer that half of the civil servants in the ministries 
reported that horizontal coordination was good. Horizontal coordination was seen as 
much more problematic than vertical coordination within own policy area, indicating 
that concern about re-establishing whole-of-government, which is a feature of post-
NPM reforms, was rather strong (Christensen and Lægreid 2007b). 
 
The significance of tenure on tasks, attitudes and 
contacts 
This section focuses on how the different independent variables, i.e. our indicators of 
generational, cumulative career and democratic perspectives, correlate with tasks, 
attitudes and contact patterns. We first address the generational perspective by focusing 
on the bivariate relations between tenure and the dependent variables. 
 Table 9 reveals some significant effects of tenure. First, there is a significant effect on 
tasks. Civil servants with short tenure spend less time on coordination than employees 
with long tenure. Second, we see a significant effect on political signals. Civil servants 
with short tenure tend to pay less attention to signals from political executives than 
those with longer tenure.  
 Third, there is an effect on identification, meaning that civil servants with long tenure 
tend to identify more strongly with their own ministry or central government in general 
than employees with short tenure. Fourth, there is also an effect on contact patterns. 
People with long tenure tend to have more frequent contact with administrative leaders 
in their own ministry, with political executives and also with interest organizations. 
Finally, tenure also affects reform-orientation. People with long tenure tend to be more 
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satisfied with cross-sectoral coordination, less concerned with post-NPM problems and 
more preoccupied with performance reporting than civil servants with short tenure.  
  
Table 9. Tenure in central government by tasks, rule-orientation, signals, identification, contact pattern 
and reform orientation. Percentage. 2006.  
 Tenure  
 Under 5 years 5-15 years Over 15 
years 
Pearson R 
Tasks: 
Single cases 
Coordination 
 
23 
36 
 
15 
49 
 
20 
49 
 
.03 
-.12** 
Rule-oriented 42 39 40 .03 
Signals: 
From political executives 
Professional considerations 
 
65 
60 
 
76 
64 
 
77 
64 
 
-.06* 
.03 
Identification: 
Own department 
Own ministry 
Central government in general 
 
85 
77 
41 
 
85 
80 
53 
 
84 
84 
62 
 
.01 
-.11** 
-.14** 
Contact: 
Own minister 
Administrative leadership in own 
ministry 
Interest organizations in business, 
trade and industry 
 
79 
 
25 
13 
 
86 
36 
19 
 
84 
42 
 
15 
 
-.09** 
-.13** 
-.07* 
Reform-orientation 
Performance reporting, evaluation 
Horizontal coordination 
 
36 
39 
 
38 
45 
 
42 
46 
 
-.06* 
-.10** 
N (average) 423 650 402  
Tasks: Percentage spending most of their time on single cases or coordination;  
Rules: Percentage with very clear/clear rules/practice;  
Signals: Percentage reporting that signals are important or very important;  
Identification: Percentage reporting strong or very strong identification;  
Contact: Percentage with contact once a month or more often; 
Performance reporting, evaluation: Percentage saying that this tool is important or very important; 
Horizontal coordination: Percentage reporting the horizontal coordination is good or very good. 
  
That said, tenure does not seem to affect the amount of time civil servants spend 
working on single cases, whether their daily work is strongly rule-constrained or not, the 
extent that they identify with their own department or the importance of professional 
considerations in their daily work. Still, the main result here is that tenure matters. 
 
LIVING  IN THE  PAST?. ..  WORKING  PAPER  1  -  2008 
 
 23 
Multivariate analysis: The relative explanatory 
power of tenure, position and demography 
We now turn to the question of the relative explanatory power of the different 
independent variables. A central question is whether the effect of tenure is sustained 
when we control for cumulative career aspects, such as position, or demographic 
features, like gender and education.   
 When controlling for structural and democratic features, we first see that the effect 
of tenure generally tends to be weakened (Tables 10 and 11), a result that tallies closely 
with earlier analyses of this type of civil service survey (Lægreid and Olsen 1978, 
Christensen and Lægreid 1998a). This is especially the case for contact patterns, which 
indicates clearly that this is the set of dependent variables most directly related to 
leadership and the one that varies among different hierarchical levels, all the more so 
when there are fewer leaders at the top, as shown in Table 2. Tenure has no significant 
effect on contact with political or administrative executives or with interest 
organizations after controlling for position, gender and education, which is somewhat 
surprising, at least from a career perspective point of view. One would have thought 
that those with long tenure would have accumulated quite a variety of good contacts, 
regardless of whether they end up in a leadership position.  
  
Table 10. Summary of regression equations by tenure, position and demographic features affecting tasks, 
rule orientation and identities. Standardized Beta coefficients. Linear regression. 2006. 
 Tasks  
Rule-
orientation 
Identification 
 Single 
cases 
Coordination Own 
department 
Own 
ministry 
Central 
government 
Tenure -.01 -.06* .00 .05 -.06* -.11** 
Position .08** -.18** .07** -.11** -.14** -.13** 
Demography: 
-Gender 
-Jurists 
-Social scientists 
-Economists 
 
.04 
.12** 
-.02 
.07* 
 
.02 
-.22** 
.14** 
-.05 
 
-.05* 
.09** 
-.06* 
.03 
 
.02 
.09** 
.00 
.04 
 
.02 
-.02 
-.01 
-.03 
 
-.02 
.10** 
.08** 
.01 
R 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F statistics 
Sign. Of F 
N 
.15 
.02 
.02 
5.697 
.000 
1451 
.37 
.14 
.13 
37.857 
.000 
1465 
.15 
.02 
.02 
5.800 
.000 
1480 
.15 
.02 
.02 
5.525 
.000 
1468 
.17 
.03 
.03 
7.649 
.000 
1470 
.21 
.04 
.04 
10.930 
.000 
1454 
 
Second, there are still some significant effects of tenure related to having coordination 
tasks, identity with own ministry or central government in general, reform orientation 
towards post-NPM challenges, and the importance of signals from political executives. 
This seems to indicate a career effect, i.e. the more experienced people are, the more 
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general tasks they have, the less concerned they are with horizontal coordination 
problems, the broader their identity and the more political sensitivity they have because 
of learning effects. 
 
Table 11. Summary of regression equations by tenure, position and demographic features affecting 
signals, contact pattern and reform orientation. Standardized Beta coefficients. Linear regression. 2006. 
 Signals Contact Reform-orientation 
 Political
execu-
tives 
Professional
conside-
rations 
 
Minister
Top 
civil 
servants
 
Interest
org. 
Per-
formance 
reporting 
Horiz-ontal 
coordinaton
Tenure -.05* .03 -.01 -0.4 -.03 -.03 -.10** 
Position -.10** -.06* -.39** -.21** -.10** -.13** -.05 
Demography: 
-Gender 
-Jurists 
-Social 
scientists 
-Economists 
 
.03 
.24** 
 
.20** 
.14** 
 
-.09** 
.15** 
 
.01 
.01 
 
.11** 
.05 
 
.12** 
.14** 
 
.07** 
.10** 
 
.14** 
.13** 
 
.11 
.09 
 
.04 
.12** 
 
-.05 
-.10** 
 
.10** 
.03 
 
-.08** 
.03 
 
.01 
.01 
R 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F Statistics 
Sign of F. 
N 
.27 
.07 
.07 
18.766 
.000 
1480 
.18 
.03 
.03 
8.151 
.000 
1480 
.45 
.21 
.20 
63.610 
.000 
1486 
.29 
.08 
.08 
22.349 
.000 
1472 
.21 
.04 
.04 
6.389 
.000 
1476 
.28 
.04 
.04 
9.731 
.000 
1273 
.14 
.02 
.02 
4.024 
.001 
1181 
 
 Third, the most important factor for understanding variations in civil servants’ 
attitudes and behaviour is position in the hierarchy. Position has a significant effect on 
all our dependent variables except one and is especially strong when it comes to contact 
with political and administrative executives and having coordinating tasks, but also when 
it comes to identification with one’s own department, ministry and the civil service in 
general, as well as the importance of performance reporting. The identity effect is 
interesting because it shows two things. Leaders are overall more committed to the civil 
service than executive officers at the grass roots, which would be expected from both a 
socialization and a discipline point of view, but there is not much difference in the level 
of identification between the two groups. This is somewhat surprising, since leaders as 
such are formally more obliged to think about the whole organization and structurally 
are in a position to do so. 
 Fourth, there are also significant effects of education. Jurists tend to be very involved 
in individual cases and less in coordination tasks, which is very much in line with the 
traditional profile of this group (Christensen and Roness 1999). They are more rule-
oriented and identify more strongly with their own department or the central 
government in general. The latter seems somewhat strange, but one explanation may be 
that this combines an overall narrow perspective, with jurists still having a solid position 
in leadership roles. Jurists also tend to pay great heed to signals from political 
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executives, but also to professional considerations. They also have close contacts with 
administrative executives in their own ministry and with interest organizations, the latter 
probably reflecting their focus on single cases. In addition, they pay less heed to 
performance reporting than people with other professional backgrounds.  
 By contrast, social scientists are more occupied with coordination and are less rule- 
oriented, reflecting the type of education they have received. They identify strongly with 
central government in general, and signals from political executives are important; 
probably reflecting a ‘government-friendly’ profile. They also have close contact with 
political and administrative executives and score high on the importance of performance 
reporting. Economists tend to work more on single cases; they pay great attention to 
political signals and have close contact with political and administrative executives and 
interest organizations. This is a more mixed profile, probably reflecting the fact that 
some of this group are national economists and some business economists. In these 
surveys it was established early on that the national economists had good contacts with 
the political leadership, partly because of their planning expertise and partly because 
they were disproportionately represented in leadership positions. The latter feature is 
now even stronger, while the business economists are probably the ones taking care of 
single cases. 
 Fifth, there are also some effects of gender. Women tend to be more rule-oriented, 
which may reflect structural position. They also pay greater attention to professional 
considerations than men, which may reflect that they see such considerations as the 
foundation for making a career in the civil service. And they have less contact with 
political and administrative executives as well as with interest organizations; probably 
reflecting the fact that they are less represented in leadership positions than men, even 
though this situation is changing. Added to this, they also tend to see fewer horizontal 
coordination problems than men. 
 
Discussion 
How do our main results measure up to the three perspectives outlined? First, not many 
of the results fulfil the expectations we had based on the generational perspective, even 
though a few elements may do. We had expected civil servants with long tenure to score 
high on single cases and rule-orientation, because their formative years were in the ‘old 
public administration’ period, when single cases made up a greater proportion of their 
tasks, but we do not find such an effect, in fact we find no effect at all of tenure here. 
Long tenure was also expected to be coupled to performing fewer coordination tasks, 
because coordination has obtained a renewed attention in the central civil service over 
the last years. Here we actually find quite the opposite. Concerning identity, we expected 
identification with own ministry to be strong, because civil servants with long tenure 
started their career in a very sectorized system. Although there is a significant 
correlation between tenure and this type of identification, this effect is slightly stronger 
than the effect on identification with the whole ministry; a presupposed effect of the 
career perspective. 
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 Tenure does correlate positively with political signals, while there is no effect on 
professional considerations. The correlation with political signals was expected from a 
generational perspective, because we assumed that exposure to political signals and 
contact with political leaders were stronger two to three decades ago, but here our 
prediction from the career perspective was the same anyway, only based on other 
mechanisms. Concerning professional considerations, the results are inconclusive, but 
they lean less towards a generational perspective than a career one, since we expected 
people with short tenure, whose experiences would be mainly from the last decade, to 
attend more to professional considerations. Concerning contacts, we expected a less 
pronounced profile for the generational perspective than the career one, and there are 
overall no significant results here. 
 Overall, the results for our expectations from a generational perspective were rather 
mixed. Either there were no significant correlations (rule-orientation and contacts), or 
the results were the opposite of what we expected (coordination tasks or reform 
orientation) or else they were mixed (identification). The only result that confirms our 
expectations is that those with long tenure attend more to political signals, but this does 
not differ much from the career perspective, so the main conclusion is that the 
generational perspective has rather weak explanatory power. 
 When we move on to the career perspective the picture is different. We expected 
that long tenure and high hierarchical position would lead to less focus on single cases 
and more on coordinative tasks and this basically accords with the main results, except 
for tenure and single cases. Concerning identity the results are more mixed, because the 
main expectation from the career perspective was that leaders and people with long 
tenure would score higher on identification with the civil service as a whole, while the 
result is that there is very little differentiation among the different measures of identity, 
i.e. position and tenure are important for all of them.  
 We expected that long tenure and high position in the hierarchy to produce more 
attention towards political signals, and this is indeed the case, but as mentioned above, 
this does not differ much from the generational perspective. We did not expect any 
clear results concerning professional considerations, but we find that leaders actually 
attend more to such considerations. We also expected leaders to have a contact pattern 
showing broad and frequent contacts and that is actually the strongest correlation in the 
regression analysis. The same type of expectation for civil servants with long tenure was 
not fulfilled, however. We expected leaders and people with long tenure to attend more 
to performance reporting and to see fewer coordination problems. Here we find an 
interesting and differentiated result, showing leaders to be more preoccupied with 
performance reporting, a typical vertical measure, and civil servants with long tenure 
more satisfied with cross-sectoral coordination, indicating that long experience and 
broad contact patterns matter. 
 Overall, the conclusion is that many of our main results could be fitted into a career 
perspective. As expected, of the two independent variables in the perspective, formal 
position is the strongest one and shows an expected and partly strong correlation with 
the dependent variables. There are, however, also some significant but weaker 
correlations related to tenure, meaning that position is not the only important aspect of 
the career perspective. There is an independent effect of tenure, showing that civil 
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servants with long tenure tend to work more with coordinative tasks, identify more 
broadly with the civil service and attend more to political signals. 
 The demographic perspective also seems to be significant. The story here is primarily 
that the jurists as an educational group are significant for nearly all the dependent 
variables. They work more with single cases and less with coordination than the other 
educational groups, they have the strongest overall identification pattern, they attend 
most to both political signals and professional considerations and they have overall the 
broadest and most frequent contacts. This shows that in many ways the jurists have 
managed to maintain their strong and dominant historical profile as civil servants. From 
1814 onwards jurists dominated the central civil service in Norway and this lasted up 
until the 1970s. They held most of the leadership positions, their educational 
background meant their dominant administrative technology was rule-orientation, and 
they managed to combine proximity to political leaders with close attendance to 
professional norms and values (Slagstad 1998). Basically, they were the most 
professional group in the civil service, and this generally still seems to be the case. 
 The social scientists have a less clear profile as a group in the civil service, but are 
definitely emerging as a strong group competing with the jurists. If we compare the 
social scientists to the jurists, the significant results for the jurists are broader and 
stronger, but there are similarities between them concerning identification, signals and 
contacts. The main difference between the two groups is that the social scientists work 
less with rules and on single cases and much more with coordinative tasks. Rather 
surprisingly, the economists are similar to the jurists concerning working with single 
cases, while they have similarities with both the jurists and the social scientists 
concerning signals and contacts. 
 When it comes to gender women have much less contact with political, 
administrative and private actors than men, even after controlling for position. We 
believe that this result still reflects a gender difference, in that leadership experience 
imposes obligations and offers opportunities to develop a hierarchical contact pattern. 
The fact that women are more rule-oriented may also reflect this. Interestingly enough, 
women attend more than men to professional considerations, without scoring lower on 
political signals. This may indicate an orientation that is not only directed towards 
casework but also towards following norms that are important for recruitment.  
 
Conclusion 
The data provided by surveys covering 30 years of development in the central civil 
service in Norway enable us both to trace development features and to discover the 
dynamics concerning the working of the civil service. We started out by describing the 
development in structure and demography over the three last decades. The main 
impression is one of both change and stability. While there have been significant 
changes in tasks, contact with interest organizations and along demographic dimensions 
such as gender and education, there has also been a stable pattern over time regarding 
rule-orientation and role considerations. From 1976 to 2006 there was no general 
WORKING  PAPER  1  –  2008 LIVING  IN THE  PAST?. ..  
 
28 
decline in rule-orientation. Thus, the administrative culture seems to have been quite 
resistant to the reform ideas advanced by the NPM movement. The NPM movement 
does not represent a decisive move away from a rule-based approach.  
 The main picture is increased complexity. New reform tools have been added to 
existing measures. What we see is reforms with a supplementary function rather than a 
process in which post-NPM reforms have replaced NPM reforms. New measures have 
been added without a substantial reduction in the old ones. We do not see a general 
trend towards a deregulated, and entrepreneurial government, as suggested by the 
contemporary reform movement, but rather the emergence of some reshaped and some 
new reform tools often emerging in hybrid forms (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 
2006). Traditional Weberian administrative features, post-Weberian reform tools, NPM 
features and post-NPM measures are combined in a complex way (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2007a). 
 The main hierarchical structure of the civil service has changed during this period, i.e. 
the proportion of top leaders has been halved, while the share of mid-level positions has 
increased substantially. This is a reflection of a continuous process of structural 
differentiation in the civil service, which has resulted in more exclusiveness at the top 
and less access to top leaders who are struggling with capacity and attention problems. 
Another structural change is that more civil servants are working on planning and 
coordination tasks and fewer on single cases. This reflects a major principle of NPM, 
namely that the ministry should be a secretariat for the political leadership (Christensen 
and Lægreid 1998b). This means that a ministry should take care of planning, 
coordinative and strategic tasks, in addition to having the capacity to serve the political 
leadership on an ad hoc basis when needed, while single cases should be moved to the 
agencies. This is an old doctrine, which became established in 1955 because of capacity 
problems in the political leadership, but was revived with the NPM reforms 
(Christensen 2003). 
 Concerning demographic features these three decades have brought about a radical 
increase in the proportion of women in the civil service from 15% in 1976 to 48% in 
2006, with a less steep increase over the past decade. In terms of education, women 
have come to dominate the professions from which civil servants are mainly recruited, 
so their share will probably increase even more. They are also gradually climbing higher 
in the hierarchy, with the greatest increase in women in leadership positions in the last 
decade. The educational structure is also changing quite a lot. While the proportion of 
jurists has almost been halved since 1976, their share has remained stable over the last 
decade, probably reflecting the process of adaptation to the EU. The social scientists, 
dominated by political scientists, increased their share from 4% in 1976 to 24% in 2006, 
thereby taking over as the largest educational group. The proportion of economists has 
remained relatively stable. 
 We took as our point of departure tenure as a main variable of civil service 
development and compared this variable with structural and demographic variables. 
Tenure is different from other demographic variables because it does not attend to 
social background, but more to what happens in the course of a civil servant’s career. 
We asked whether civil servants were living in the past, meaning whether their attitudes 
were primarily shaped by the period and context when they entered the civil service, and 
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whether the tasks they have, the identities they develop, the signals and attitudes they 
have, and their contact patterns will later be heavily influenced by this. We labelled this a 
generational perspective and contrasted it with a career perspective, which focuses more 
on the experience accumulated in the course of a civil servant’s career, which entails 
tenure and formal position variables, and with a demographic perspective, which 
focuses on individual demographic features. Rather than looking for single-factor 
explanations we need to understand the combinations of generational, career and 
demographic factors. A male jurist with long tenure and holding a high position will 
have a quite different civil servant profile to a female social scientist with short tenure 
and a low position. 
 The main results indicate clearly that civil servants are not living in the past, because 
few factors from the generational perspective seem to be significant. The strongest 
explanatory perspective is the career one, i.e. the experience that civil servants have 
acquired in the course of their career is significant for various indicators of decision-
making behaviour. Thus organizational socialization and discipline within the central 
government seem to be crucial. Organizational factors are crucial. Civil servants seem to 
adapt quickly to the requirements of the position they hold at any given time. When 
they move to a new position they also change their responsibilities and they adapt 
quickly to the constraints and opportunities connected with their new position. To 
understand their tasks, attitudes and contact patterns it is more important to know what 
their position in the organizational structure is than where they come from or how long 
their tenure is (Lægreid 1988). Accumulating experience, according to this perspective, 
means on the one hand moving up the hierarchy gradually, giving civil servants an 
increasing number of leadership obligations and duties, but also, as they reach the top of 
the hierarchy, acquiring a more holistic perspective. But long tenure also implies being 
exposed to a broader variety of tasks and being pressured to think in broader terms and 
to be politically and professionally sensitive, accumulate contacts, etc. We show that of 
these two main cumulative factors, formal position is the most significant one, but 
tenure is evidently important as well and of independent significance. We also conclude 
that the demographic perspective is also significant, with the main effects connected 
with being a jurist, which has been the dominant professional group in the Norwegian 
central civil service for a long time. 
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Append i x :  
 
Dependent variables used in the regression analysis: 
Tasks:  
“How much of your working time would you estimate you have spent on various tasks 
over the last year”? We then listed 10 different tasks. For each task the civil servants 
were asked to answer on a scale from 1 (totally dominating) to 5 (totally absent); in this 
paper we use two of the tasks (single cases and coordination). 
 
Identity:  
“Below we will ask you to report how strong or weak your sense of belonging or 
identification is with the following organizational units”. We then listed four units and 
for each of them the respondents were asked to answer on a scale from 1 (very strong) 
to 5 (very weak). In this paper we use three of the units (own department, own ministry 
and central government in general) 
 
Signals: 
“What weight do you give to each of the following considerations while executing your 
tasks”? We then listed 12 different considerations and asked the respondents to answer 
on each of them on a scale from 1 (very important) to 5 (very unimportant). In this 
paper we use two of the considerations (signals from political executives and 
professional considerations). 
 
Contact: 
“If you think of your average yearly contact, approximately how often do you have 
contact with your own minister”. 1) Once a week 2) Once a month 3) Less often 4) 
Never. 
 
“How often would you estimate that you had contact with the administrative leadership 
in your own ministry over the last year (Secretary General, Director General)?” 1) Once 
a week or more often 2) Once a month 3) Less often 4) Never. Not relevant is excluded. 
 
“Approximately how often have you had work-related contact with organizations in 
business, trade and industry over the last year”? 1) Weekly or more often 2) Once a 
month 3) Less often 4) Never. 
 
Reform orientation: 
“In connection with the modernization and renewal work in the government several 
reform tools have been introduced. How important are the following reform tools in 
your own field of work”? We then listed 26 different tools and asked the respondents to 
rate each of them on a scale from 1 (very important) to 5 (not important at all). In this 
paper we use the tools: “Evaluation/performance reporting. New control and auditing 
routines”. 
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“How would you characterize the coordination of your own field of work with 
government bodies in other policy areas/sectors”? Respondents were asked on a scale 
from 1 (very good) to 5 (very bad). 
 
Independent variables used in the regression analyses: 
 
Tenure: 1) less than 5 years, 2) 5-15 years, 3) More than 15 years;  
Position: 1) Lower position, 2) Director General/head of division and higher;  
Gender: 1) Man, 2) Woman;  
Jurist: 1) Yes, 2) No;  
Social scientist: 1) Yes, 2) No;  
Economist: 1) Yes, 2) No 
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